False Arrest or Imprisonment - California Law Overview

Under California law, the civil versions of “false arrest” and “false imprisonment” are the same tort: false arrest is considered simply “one way of committing a false imprisonment.” Watts v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2001). This cause of action will sometimes be brought as a companion to a claim under federal law for an unreasonable detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The elements of this tort, under California law, are (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief. Young v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011). The core jury instructions are CACI Nos. 1401 and 1402.

Under California law, an officer has probable cause for a warrantless arrest “if the facts known to him would lead a [person] of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.” People v. Adams, 175 Cal. App. 3d 855, 221 Cal.Rptr. 298, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (citation and quotations omitted). The fact that an arrest that appears to be supported by probable cause at the time of the arrest is later found to have been made in error does not mean there was not a basis to carry out the arrest in the first place. Peng v. Hu, 335 F.3d 970, 976-78 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding probable cause to arrest based on one witness providing sufficiently detailed facts regarding the incident). Similarly, the facts that charges ultimately did not get filed or that the defendant was later acquitted of the charges do not necessarily mean that probable cause did not exist when the officer acted. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979); Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995). A case that tries to Monday-morning-quarterback the judgment of a law enforcement officer in this regard is not going to get very far, where the nature of the plaintiff’s argument is simply that the facts could have been viewed differently.

However, when a reasonable officer should have followed obvious avenues for investigation, particularly around the identity of the person being arrested or the very question of whether a crime has actually occurred, probable cause to perform a warrantless arrest may be missing. See Hutchinson v. Grant, 796 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1986) (police officer who mistook arrestee for a burglary suspect with the same name was not entitled to summary judgment in connection with arrest where he took no steps to verify the arrestee's identity before arresting him); Merriman v. Walton, 856 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1988); Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991); Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the claim of a citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate the basis of the witness’ knowledge or interview other witnesses”). In other words, failure to get the objective facts right or failure to perform required investigation is more likely to be a basis for liability than merely making a subjective weighing of a body of evidence in a manner that later turns out to be have been incorrect.

What if officers rely on a warrant in making an arrest, but the warrant is obviously defective or is for some other person altogether? Where there are obvious physical differences between the person and arrested and the person described in the warrant, the fact that the warrant exists does not render the arrest legal. See, e.g., Gant v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting suspect was listed as 6'1" tall and weighing 200 lbs, while arrestee's driver's license indicated that he was 5'6" tall and weighed 180 lbs). Where there is a reasonable error about who the suspect is, however, the existence of the warrant may be fatal to the claim. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971). A warrant can also be facially defective, such that a reasonable officer should realize it is defective, where it lacks particularity or where there are other obvious problems apparent on its face. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). Notably, these reliance-on-a-warrant scenarios are ones in which qualified immunity is likely to shield law enforcement under federal law, but a more viable path may be found under state law.

While law enforcement officials have many immunities in the performance of their duties, California Government Code section 820.4 specifically excludes from immunity government actors’ “liability for false arrest or false imprisonment.” See Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 757 (1997) (“under California law, a police officer may be held liable for false arrest and false imprisonment, but not for malicious prosecution").

Damages in a civil false arrest/false imprisonment claim under California law are subject to the limitation spelled out in Asgari, 15 Cal. 4th at 748: namely, that no compensation can be recovered for time spent in custody after arraignment.

To consult about potential civil rights cases, call today.

California's Bane Act - An Overview

California’s Tom Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1, makes it illegal to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempt to interfere by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual secured by the Constitution or laws of California.

The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by improper means, “tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883 (2007)

The most obvious applications of Bane Act claims occur when physical force or other forms of coercion are used to violate a person’s rights, and Bane Act claims are often brought as a California-law counterpart to a claim of excessive force under federal law. “Mere words” are typically not enough to be the basis for a claim, though if the words involve a threat of violence or arrest they can be sufficient. See, e.g., Cuviello v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 940 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1103 (N.D.Cal. 2013). Additionally, “retaliatory actions may be sufficient to state a Bane Act claim based upon coercion or intimidation.” N.M. v. Ramona Unified Sch. Dist., No. 24-cv-2306-BJC-MSB, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46893 at * 18 (S.D.Cal. March 6, 2026) ; Bailey v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist., No. 2:23-cv-01750-KJM-DMC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210247, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2024).

The Bane Act is interpreted as having a “specific intent” component that has been the subject of a great deal of debate. That intent component, however, does not require an intent to violate the law: “A reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of those rights.”  Reese v. Cty.of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1045 (9th Cir. 2018).  The intent component also does not “require a showing that a defendant knew he was acting unlawfully; reckless disregard of the ‘right at issue’ is all that is necessary.” Luttrell v. Hart, No. 5:19-CV-07300-EJD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173856, 2020 WL 5642613, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2020) (citation omitted).

In a custodial setting like a jail or prison, “deliberate indifference” — the same mental state that needs to be established to make out an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim — will also satisfy the specific intent component of the Bane Act. Cornell v. City and County of San Francisco, 17 Cal.App.5th 766, 802, n. 31 (2017).​ As discussed elsewhere on this blog, the Eighth Amendment version of deliberate indifference requires a “subjective” showing of intent, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment version of deliberate indifference that applies in situations involving pretrial detainees is satisfied by a less demanding “objective” showing. This less-demanding “objective” form of deliberate indifference is sufficient to satisfy the intent component of the Bane Act. See Est. of Hernandez v. San Diego County, 24-cv-00032-DMS-DEB at * 25-26 (S.D.Cal. Sept. 30, 2024) (“the Court has determined that the Complaint alleges a claim under the objective deliberate indifference standard. [Citation.] Thus, the Complaint states a Bane Act claim against Defendants”).

An interesting aspect of Bane Act claims, compared to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is that the Bane Act statute contains no requirement of acting “under color of law.” See Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 333-334 (1998) (“there is no state action requirement per se” in the language of the Bane Act). In other words, the Bane Act can apply to the actions of private actors, not just folks in government.

Bane Act claims are also not subject to the regime of “qualified immunity” that can make federal civil rights litigation so vexing and unpredictable.

For free consultation about potential civil rights cases, call today.

School District Immunity Under Education Code section 44808 for Events Not Occurring at School

A California school district was immune under section 44808 of the California Education Code for liability arising from the suicide of a student who took her life at home during winter break, a California appellate court concluded in a decision published this week in Vallejo United School District v. Superior Court.

Armored Up: Statutory immunities can provide formidable protections for government actors in some situations. Photo by Jonathan Kemper on Unsplash‍. ‍

Section 44808 states, in relevant part, that districts and district employees don’t have a responsibility for the safety of students when the student is not on school property except during transportation to-or-from school, in school sponsored activities off site, or if they have “otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” As the court notes, there is some ambiguity as to whether that final section about “otherwise assuming responsibility” is a standalone carveout to the immunity or if it only applies in the transportation and outside-activity scenarios, and that ambiguity is underscored by the fairly broad way the language was interpreted by the California Supreme Court in Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District (1972) 22 Cal.3d 508.

The plaintiffs here argued that the carve-out of that last section applied to their situation, but the appellate court concluded otherwise and in fact came up with a (IMHO) very broadly worded interpretation of what section 44808 means, which actually seems to negate (or perhaps just be in tension with) some plaintiff-favorable dicta in Hoyem. That dicta had said that section 44808 withdraws immunity “when the school district, inter alia, has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Internal quotes omitted.) Vallejo United is having none of that, however, and explicitly holds: “a school district cannot be held liable for negligence that proximately causes off-campus harm when the student is no longer supposed to be under the district’s supervision.” That language will undoubtedly be quoted in many a future case, now that Vallejo United has been published.

The immunity that is at issue here is merely one of many, many immunities for government actors that are encoded in California law, which is one of the reasons civil rights litigation can be quite challenging: because these immunities are like landmines for the unwarry, potentially creating partial or even complete barriers to liability. And that’s before we even talk about the Eleventh Amendment, which is also a concern in federal litigation against California school districts.

For free consultation about potential civil rights cases, call today.

Six Months: the Magic Number in Civil Rights Claims.

Six months. Learn it, love it, know it.

Six months is the deadline for filing an administrative claim in most incidents that give rise to civil rights-type lawsuits in California, such as the use of excessive force, or unreasonable searches.

That matters because the filing of the administrative claim (and having it rejected by the municipal agency), is a requirement for going to court and bringing a cause of action under California law against an agency.

It’s possible, in some circumstances, to file a late claim, even once the six months has run. But it’s much better to get that claim filed in a timely way in the first place.

It may also be possible to pursue a case based solely on federal law if too much time has passed to be able to raise state claims. But in the best case scenario, you should always try to hit that six-month deadline for filing the administrative claim because some causes of action under California have unique strategic advantages compared to their federal equivalents.

Time has a way of passing. Don’t delay!

If you have questions about how to file an administrative claim, get in touch. We can help.

Can a Civil Rights Case With Low Damages Succeed?

A “nominal damages” civil rights case is a case where there is no obvious economic impact to the plaintiff, or only a very small economic impact. Sometimes these cases are suits for $1, or some other small figure, and sometimes such suits seek more money but recover only a symbolic $1 verdict.

Can nominal damages civil rights cases succeed? The answer is a qualified “yes,” depending on what you are trying to accomplish. If your goal is to make lots of money, obviously such a case is not going to do that for you. However, if a plaintiff is passionate about standing up for particular principles, and if those principles may resonate with other people, such a case might have legs. The federal civil rights statute provides for attorney fees even in nominal damages cases, so there can be an incentive for a lawyer to assist with such a case even if there is no big payout contemplated for the person bringing the suit.

There are some basic pragmatic issues to consider. One of the most important is simply that the plaintiff’s leverage in litigation is the threat of going to trial. So if the asserted violation of a right is so minor or trivial that it would be ridiculous to ask a jury of regular people to spend days of their own time stuck in a courtroom resolving the issue, then it probably doesn’t make sense to file that suit in the first place.

For example, consider a brief police detention that, though technically not supported by adequate legal grounds, quickly resolves with the police moving on and letting the detained person go about their business. Yes, this is probably an example of a Fourth Amendment violation. But it’s probably not a good case to pursue absent other facts (such as a discriminatory motive, repeated harassment, etc.), because no defendant will ever agree to settle the case, and if the case ever went to a jury, that jury would most likely be very annoyed at the plaintiff for having wasted their time with the matter. Why should these jurors be forced to sit for days and days in a courthouse to figure out if you were merely inconvenienced for a few minutes?

For that matter, the plaintiff also has to understand that civil rights litigation can be a slow, tedious, and time-consuming process, one that can take years to work through the system and require a considerable amount of work on the plaintiff’s part. It’s probably not worth it, from the potential plaintiff’s perspective, to go through all that aggravation to make a point about some purely technical violation of a legal standard.

With this in mind, a more promising type of “nominal damage” case is one in which the symbolic significance of the violation is high, even if the economic impact is low. Violations that touch on basic political values of our society, such as the right to peacefully protest, the right to religious freedom, or the right to be free from arbitrary state discrimination, can sometimes involve these weighty symbolic factors. The existence of important political principles or the potential for broader public impact in a case is also a factor the courts look to in assessing whether attorney fees should be awarded, and so it is a factor that a lawyer will typically consider in deciding whether to take on a case in the first place.