Under California law, the civil versions of “false arrest” and “false imprisonment” are the same tort: false arrest is considered simply “one way of committing a false imprisonment.” Watts v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 256 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir. 2001). This cause of action will sometimes be brought as a companion to a claim under federal law for an unreasonable detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The elements of this tort, under California law, are (1) the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however brief. Young v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011). The core jury instructions are CACI Nos. 1401 and 1402.
Under California law, an officer has probable cause for a warrantless arrest “if the facts known to him would lead a [person] of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.” People v. Adams, 175 Cal. App. 3d 855, 221 Cal.Rptr. 298, 301 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (citation and quotations omitted). The fact that an arrest that appears to be supported by probable cause at the time of the arrest is later found to have been made in error does not mean there was not a basis to carry out the arrest in the first place. Peng v. Hu, 335 F.3d 970, 976-78 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding probable cause to arrest based on one witness providing sufficiently detailed facts regarding the incident). Similarly, the facts that charges ultimately did not get filed or that the defendant was later acquitted of the charges do not necessarily mean that probable cause did not exist when the officer acted. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979); Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995). A case that tries to Monday-morning-quarterback the judgment of a law enforcement officer in this regard is not going to get very far, where the nature of the plaintiff’s argument is simply that the facts could have been viewed differently.
However, when a reasonable officer should have followed obvious avenues for investigation, particularly around the identity of the person being arrested or the very question of whether a crime has actually occurred, probable cause to perform a warrantless arrest may be missing. See Hutchinson v. Grant, 796 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1986) (police officer who mistook arrestee for a burglary suspect with the same name was not entitled to summary judgment in connection with arrest where he took no steps to verify the arrestee's identity before arresting him); Merriman v. Walton, 856 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1988); Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991); Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the claim of a citizen witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate the basis of the witness’ knowledge or interview other witnesses”). In other words, failure to get the objective facts right or failure to perform required investigation is more likely to be a basis for liability than merely making a subjective weighing of a body of evidence in a manner that later turns out to be have been incorrect.
What if officers rely on a warrant in making an arrest, but the warrant is obviously defective or is for some other person altogether? Where there are obvious physical differences between the person and arrested and the person described in the warrant, the fact that the warrant exists does not render the arrest legal. See, e.g., Gant v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 613 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting suspect was listed as 6'1" tall and weighing 200 lbs, while arrestee's driver's license indicated that he was 5'6" tall and weighed 180 lbs). Where there is a reasonable error about who the suspect is, however, the existence of the warrant may be fatal to the claim. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802 (1971). A warrant can also be facially defective, such that a reasonable officer should realize it is defective, where it lacks particularity or where there are other obvious problems apparent on its face. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). Notably, these reliance-on-a-warrant scenarios are ones in which qualified immunity is likely to shield law enforcement under federal law, but a more viable path may be found under state law.
While law enforcement officials have many immunities in the performance of their duties, California Government Code section 820.4 specifically excludes from immunity government actors’ “liability for false arrest or false imprisonment.” See Asgari v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 757 (1997) (“under California law, a police officer may be held liable for false arrest and false imprisonment, but not for malicious prosecution").
Damages in a civil false arrest/false imprisonment claim under California law are subject to the limitation spelled out in Asgari, 15 Cal. 4th at 748: namely, that no compensation can be recovered for time spent in custody after arraignment.
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